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Abstract  Does  better  corporate  governance  unambiguously  improve  the  risk/return 
efficiency of banks? Or does either a re-orientation of banks' revenue mix towards more 
opaque  products,  an  economic  downturn,  or  tighter  supervision  create  off-setting  or 
reinforcing  effects?  The  authors  relate  bank  efficiency  to  shortfalls  from  a  stochastic 
risk/return frontier. They analyze how internal governance mechanisms (CEO duality, 
board experience, political connections, and education profile) and external governance 
mechanisms  (discipline  exerted  by  shareholders,  depositors,  or  skilled  employees) 
determine efficiency in a sample of Turkish banks. The 2000 financial crisis was a wake-
up  call  for  bank  efficiency  and  corporate  governance.  As  a  result,  better  corporate 
governance  mechanisms  have  been  able  to  improve  risk/return  efficiency  when  the 
economic, regulatory, and supervisory environments are more stable and bank products 
are more complex.  
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The efficient mobilization and allocation of funds by banks lowers the cost of capital to 
firms,  boosts  capital  formation,  and  stimulates  productivity  growth  (Levine  2003). 
Therefore,  it  is  important  that  banks  operate  efficiently.  We  measure  efficiency  as 
shortfalls from the best practice risk/return tradeoff given banks their particular set of 
assets  and  liabilities  (as,  e.g.,  Hughes  et  al.  1996)  and  analyze  how  this  efficiency 
depends  on  the  governance  of  a  bank.  Does  better  corporate  governance 
unambiguously  improve  the  risk/return  efficiency  of  banks?  Or  does    either  a  re-
orientation  of  banks'  revenue  mix  towards  more  opaque  products,  an  economic 
downturn,  or  tighter  supervision  create  off-setting  or  reinforcing  effects?  With  these 
questions,  we  tie  together  two  separate  strands  of  literature.  This  paper  lies  at  the 
intersection  of  research  that  looks  at  the  benefits  or  threats  from  diversifying  bank 
activities into nontraditional banking activities and the literature on the impact of internal 
and  external  governance  mechanisms  on  banks'  risk-taking  behavior.  Understanding 
why some banks are more efficient than others in the transformation of risk into return is 
important in light of the current financial crisis.    
 
  The literature on the impact of the shift towards nontraditional banking activities, 
which generate noninterest income, on bank performance is inconclusive. Most of the 
research addressing the issue of the optimal scope of financial corporations takes an 
industrial  organization  approach  (in  accordance  with  the  literature  on  nonfinancial 
corporations)  and  analyzes  whether  financial  conglomerates  create  or  destroy  value 
(see,  e.g.,  Laeven  and  Levine  2007;  Schmid  and  Walter  2009).  From  a  portfolio 
perspective, expanding bank activities can also reduce a bank's risk profile. However, 
little empirical support exists for that claim as many studies actually find the opposite   3
(DeYoung and Roland 2001; Stiroh 2004; Stiroh 2006; De Jonghe 2010). We add to that 
literature by analyzing the relation between diversification and risk before, during, and 
after  a crisis.  Moreover,  by  looking  at  the  interaction  of  diversification  and  corporate 
governance characteristics, we aim to explain why different studies find opposite results. 
 
  The effect on efficiency from internal and external governance mechanisms, all 
designed to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
control, has been widely studied for industrial companies (e.g., Cremers and Nair 2005). 
Verifying whether the location of attributes are at the strategic apex of the organization is 
a common way to distinguish between internal and external governance. The internal 
components  encompass  certain  aspects  with  a  relation  to  attributes  of  the  strategic 
decision-making process, while external governance mechanisms include market and 
stakeholder oversight that seek to influence and control decisions. The issue of good 
governance  is  particularly  important  for  banks,  because  banks  themselves  exert 
corporate disciplining on firms after providing finance. Bank monitoring can provide a 
substitute  for  firms  with  weak  internal  corporate  governance  and  weak  external 
governance (Byers et al. 2008). Banks with prudent corporate governance mechanisms 
are themselves also likely to allocate their scarce resources more efficiently (Barth et al. 
2004;  Caprio  et  al.  2007).  However,  to  date,  much  less  research  exists  on  the 
governance of banking firms. Further, studies focus almost exclusively on one broad 
aspect of corporate governance by analyzing the relation between ownership structure 
(public, private, and foreign banks) and bank performance (e.g., Berger et al. 2005). In a 
recent paper, Laeven and Levine (2009) analyze how standard corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as ownership structure, interact with national regulations in shaping 
the risk-taking behavior of individual banks. We instead look at banks from one country 
(Turkey) that allows us to look in detail at a wide spectrum of corporate governance traits   4
that  have  largely  been  ignored  in  the  banking  literature  but  studied  extensively  for 
nonfinancial firms. In particular, we focus on the following traits: CEO duality, managerial 
experience and education, political connectedness, external governance, and the skill of 
the labor force. 
 
  An important aspect of internal governance is the separation between ownership 
and  control.  According  to  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983),  the  presence  of  a  CEO-duality 
structure (i.e., when the CEO concurrently serves as the chairman of the board) signals 
the  absence  of  internal  control  mechanisms  over  decision  making  that  can  have 
counterproductive effects on firm performance. This finding spurred a great amount of 
literature that stresses the importance of board independence for firm performance (see, 
e.g.,  Baysinger  and  Butler  1985).  For  example,    the  board’s  task  of  monitoring  the 
investment decisions of the CEO might be hampered (Pi and Timme 1993). In contrast, 
advocates of CEO duality (Anderson and Anthony 1986) assert that firm performance 
can be enhanced if the executive manager has full authority over his corporation by also 
serving as chairman.  
  Second,  human-capital  theory  provides  support  for  the  view  that  managerial 
attributes, such as experience and education, influence firm performance positively. The 
view being that experience is a valuable asset that increases manager productivity and 
the economic value of the firm. Within sound internal governance systems that foster 
stability  in  leadership,  experienced  managers  with  longer  tenure  might  allocate  their 
limited resources in a more risk-efficient manner. Therefore the tenure length and the 
education  profile  of  the  leadership  might  have  a  positive  relation  to  our  measure  of 
risk/return  efficiency.  Güner  et  al. (2008) find  that the financial  expertise  of directors 
affects corporate decisions. Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) find that experienced 
mutual-fund  managers  located  in  financial  centers  are  better  stock  pickers.  Although   5
human capital can also have a substantial impact on the performance of banking firms, 
the  empirical  banking  literature  largely  neglects  the  attributes  controlling  for  human 
capital.  
  Third,  we  explore  the  efficiency  effects  of  political  connections.  The  heavy 
regulation of the banking industry provides incentives for banks to develop a corporate 
political strategy and to become politically connected. Banks do so to extract rents from 
preferential treatments such as bailouts, special supervisory oversight, and regulatory 
forbearance.  For  instance,  Laeven  (2004)  and  Demirgüç-Kunt  et  al.  (2008)  find  that 
countries  with  poorly  capitalized  banks  adopt  generous  deposit-insurance  schemes, 
mainly as a result of extensive lobbying efforts. To increase their impact on public policy 
outcomes  in  ways  that  facilitate  rent  extraction  banks  might  even  appoint  politically 
connected CEOs and/or chairmen. The literature documents that political connections 
indeed offer a valuable asset in countries with weak as well as strong legal systems 
(e.g.,  Fisman  2001;  Faccio  2006;  Claessens  et  al.  2008).  However,  the  access  to 
political rents and protection from supervisory monitoring can weaken the incentive of 
politically  connected  banks  to  be  efficient  in  a  risk/return  framework  (see,  Buch  and 
DeLong 2008, for the relation between weak supervision and bank risk-taking in a cross-
country setting).  
  Fourth,  from  the  perspective  of  external  governance,  we  look  at  whether 
shareholders and other stakeholders foster a more balanced risk/return performance. In 
the absence of fully risk-based deposit insurance premiums, shareholders with limited 
liability benefit from pursuing riskier business activities—namely, lower capital ratios and 
more volatile asset returns. As shown by Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and 
Furlong  (1990),  an  increase  in  capital  requirements  can  decrease  bank  risk,  thus 
reducing the probability of bankruptcy because the value of the deposit-insurance put 
option decreases with the capital ratio. We therefore introduce capitalization as a control   6
variable. Another way of deterring excessive risk taking by banks is through depositor 
discipline,  because  banks  are  constantly  exposed  to  refinancing  risk.  Banks  can  be 
forced into effective risk management because of fears of a bank run resulting from the 
combination of long-term illiquid assets and daily callable liabilities (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983; Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988). In fact, increasing liquidation costs caused by 
high  levels  of  depository  debt  can  appropriately  discipline  the  risk-taking  behavior of 
banks  in  a  timely  manner  (Bauer  and  Ryser  2004).  Therefore,  we  also  introduce  a 
measure of depositor presence as a control variable. Employees are also important as a 
group of external stakeholders as shareholders and depositors. Hence, the education 
profile  of  the  personnel,  which  we  consider  as  outside  the  strategic  apex  of  the 
organization,  can  be  another  factor  contributing  to  the  implementation  of  “good” 
governance and explain interfirm productivity differences (Griliches and Regev 1995). 
Other  potential  mechanisms  for  external  discipline—like  stock  exchange  quotations, 
credit ratings, and auditor reports—are not consistently available for the banks in our 
sample  period.  Most  banks  are  unquoted,  only  a  few  banks  have  ratings,  and  the 
presence of auditor reports is mixed; so we do not have the required bank-level variation 
both before and after the banking crisis for these external governance mechanisms.    
 
The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  threefold.  First,  we  examine  risk  and  return 
simultaneously in a unique setting. Often, researchers use a Sharpe ratio to examine 
how  various  bank  characteristics  affect  both  aspects  jointly  (e.g.,  Cyree  et  al.  2011; 
Rime and Stiroh 2003). We analyze the extent to which banks deviate from the best 
practice risk/return tradeoff, given their particular set of assets and liabilities. Under the 
assumption of risk aversion, the definition of the risk/return frontier is the set of bank 
portfolios that minimize the variance of the portfolio return for all portfolios with the same 
expected return or, vice versa, that maximize the expected return for all portfolios with   7
the same variance. As with Hughes et al. (1996), we apply the stochastic frontier method 
to relate the risk of a bank’s portfolio to the returns that portfolio generates. Further, the 
portfolio framework employed in this paper does not necessarily label all risk taking as 
imprudent; some banks are just more efficient in coping with risk than others. Hence, this 
approach  has  the  advantage  that  it  acknowledges  that  more  risky  banks  generate 
different returns (move along the frontier) but also that returns can vary for banks with a 
similar risk profile (distance from the frontier).  We differ from Hughes et al. (1996) by 
using the portfolio approach of banking (e.g., Francis 1978; Freixas and Rochet 1997). 
The few studies that examine the risk/return relation do not use the portfolio approach of 
risk or focus exclusively on the slope of the production function (Hughes et al. 1996; 
Koetter 2008). The Turkish banking data are very suitable for employing a portfolio view 
of risk because the published bank data provide detailed coverage of the balance sheet, 
the income statement, and the off-balance sheet items. Subsequently, we analyze which 
determinants  affect  the  risk/return  efficiency.  This  risk/return  efficiency  captures  how 
efficiently a bank with a certain risk profile transforms risk into return as compared to its 
best performing peer. 
Second, using data on a single country, Turkey, we shed light on several hitherto 
understudied aspects of the corporate governance of banks and their impact on bank 
risk/return efficiency. In particular, we consider ownership (private, public, or foreign), the 
education profile of bank personnel as well as the CEO, banks' political connectedness, 
the institutional memory  (age)  of the bank,  CEO  tenure length  and  the  ability  of the 
board to monitor and discipline the bank manager (CEO duality). These variables have 
only been analyzed, usually separately, for nonfinancial firms.  
  Third, we contribute by  documenting that the impact of corporate governance 
traits  on  banks'  risk/return  profiles  is  conditional  on  product  complexity  and  on  the 
economic, regulatory, and supervisory environment. It is conceivable that the impact of   8
CEO  duality  can  change  with  the  environment  in  which  firms  operate.  Rechner  and 
Dalton  (1991)  report  that  the  impact  of  CEOs  on  firm  performance  can  alter  with 
business-cycle  conditions.  They  find  that  firms  separating  the  roles  of  CEO  and 
chairman outperform their counterparts more firmly in periods with high financial returns. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) provide a model of a bargaining game between the CEO 
and the board. In a booming economy, boards are in equilibrium reactive to good firm 
performance, which will give the CEO more bargaining power and reduces actual board 
independence, while during downturns boards become more proactive and independent. 
This finding implies that  a  negative  economic  shock  is  expected  to alter  the  relation 
between board characteristics like duality or schooling and risk/return efficiency. Indeed, 
the current financial crisis also gives a reason to scrutinize and revise the role of bank 
boards (see Kirkpatrick 2009),  and more independent  and  able  boards might  be the 
expected  outcome.  We  exploit  the  Turkish  banking  crisis  of  2000–2001  to  test  this 
conjecture. The  banking  crisis in Turkey provides  an  excellent  laboratory  not  only  to 
assess the risk/return efficiency before and after a crisis, but also to disentangle the 
differential  impact  of  bank  corporate  governance  on  risk-taking  before  and  after  the 
crisis. Moreover, Turkish banks were very active in nontraditional activities before and 
after  the  2000–2001  crisis,  and  an  initial  economic  downturn  and tighter  supervision 
characterized the post-crisis period.  
 
  Our  results  suggest  that  many  corporate  governance  traits  indeed  matter  for 
risk/return efficiency and that the 2000–2001 financial crisis served as a wake-up call.  
Traits that we usually associate with good corporate governance seem to be all the more 
important for the risk/return efficiency of banks that are engaged in complex and opaque 
activities,  if  regulation  and  supervision  are  tight  enough.  Our  most  robust  findings 
concern CEO non-duality; that is,  when a bank does not vest the functions of CEO and   9
chairman in the same individual. We find that CEO non-duality generally helps banks to 
attain a higher risk/return efficiency. Especially for opaque nontraditional activities, CEO 
non-duality does not seem to be very helpful in chasing out risk/return inefficiencies in 
the  pre-crisis  period,  while  it  turns  helpful  in  the  post-crisis  period.  The  general 
conclusion  is  that  the  relation  between  corporate  governance  traits  and  risk/return 
efficiency  is  conditional  on  product  complexity  and  the  economic,  regulatory,  and 
supervisory environments.   
 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of three subsections in 
which we describe how we measure risk and return, the stochastic frontier method, and 
the construction of the sample and the variables. In Section 3, we present the results of 
the  stochastic  risk/return  frontier  model  along  with  the  marginal  effects  of  the 
determinants of risk/return efficiency. Section 4 presents the extensions and robustness 
checks. Section 5 reports the conclusions. 
 
2 Method and data 
 
2.1 Mean variance framework 
 
This paper has a relation to the portfolio approach of banking in which the bank is similar 
to a portfolio manager (e.g., Francis 1978; Freixas and Rochet 1997). Following Francis 
(1978), the asset and liability items are isolated to provide a parsimonious model with a 
manageable  number  of  variables  in  which  the  liabilities  are  equivalent  to  negative 
assets. The equity base of bank i in a certain period t is given by [we omit the subscripts 
i (bank specific) and t (time specific) for simplicity of presentation]: 
   10
                                           ,          (1) 
       (Total assets)          (Total liabilities )    Equity 
 
where  assets  are  nonbank  loans  (L),  securities  (S),  bank  loans  (B),  money  market 
investments (MM), and other assets (OA). Liabilities are classified into three groups and 
are considered as negative assets: deposits (D), non-deposit funds (ND) , and other 
liabilities  (OL).
2  All  variables  are  averages  of  beginning  and  end-of-year  values.  
Rescaling Eq. 1 by equity, we obtain the portfolio weights of assets and liabilities: 
 
                                                      1 ,               (2) 
 
where w represents a weight of a specific activity relative to the portfolio size. Asset 
weights  are  non-negative, the weights  of  liabilities  are  non-positive. The  total rate of 
return (R) of the bank’s balance sheet, calculated as the return on equity, can be defined 
for each bank i and period t as: 
                                                                      , (3) 
where the r is the rates of return on the respective assets and liabilities.  
 
The risk of the total bank portfolio (RK) is defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
2 Balance sheet classes are chosen in accordance with the published income streams from the 
income statement and are defined as follows: Non-bank Loans (L) = short-term loans + medium 
and long term loans + follow-up loans (net);   Securities (S) = trading securities + investment 
securities available for sale + investment securities held to maturity;   Bank Loans (B) = due from 
banks  (domestic  and  foreign)  +  other  financial  institutions;  Money  Market  Securities  (MM)  = 
interbank  money  market  placements  +  Istanbul  Stock  Exc  money  market  placements  + 
receivables from reverse repurchase agreement;  Other Assets (OA) = cash + balances with the 
Central  Bank  +  reserve  deposits  +  permanent  assets  (investments  and  associates  (net)  + 
subsidiaries (net) + property and equipment (net)) + other receivables; Deposits (D) = demand 
and time deposits; Non Deposit Funds = funds borrowed from the Central Bank, banks, foreign 
banks and other financial institutions; Other Liabilities = interbank money market takings + (net) 
issued marketable securities + other resources other than total equity   11
    ,  
 
  ∑∑  , ,   , ,   , , ,              (4) 
 
where    is the weight of the     asset or liability for bank i in a certain period t; and, 
  ,  is the covariance between the     and     asset (or liability) for bank i. For each 
bank,  sample-period  returns  of  each  asset  and  liability  are  used  to  estimate  the 
covariance matrix. Hence, this covariance matrix is bank-specific but time-invariant. This 
characteristic means that the time variation in bank risk     ,   for a particular bank is 
the result of changes in the chosen portfolio allocations across banking assets.
3 Every 
possible asset combination can be plotted in the risk/return space. For every level of 
return there exists one portfolio with the lowest risk; conversely, for every level of risk 
there is one portfolio with the highest return. The combination of all such portfolios is 
called the efficient frontier and is estimated via the stochastic frontier method. 
 
2.2 Empirical model 
 
A stochastic frontier production model, originally and independently proposed by Aigner 
et  al.  (1977)  and  Meeusen  and  van  den  Broeck  (1977),  is  applied  to  estimate  the 
technical risk/return efficiency scores for each bank at each point in time. Subsequent 
studies have extended the original model in order to explain the inefficiency scores; that 
is, the departures from the stochastic frontier. We employ a one-step stochastic frontier 
model  in  which  the  parameters  of  the  frontier  are  estimated  simultaneously  with  the 
impact of the bank-specific determinants on the inefficiency score.
4 
                                                 
3  In  Section  4,  as  a  robustness  check,  we  take  into  account  the  time  varying  nature  of  the 
variance-covariance matrix by using a historical five-year rolling window. 
4 The two-stage approach in which the first stage involves the estimation of technical inefficiency 
using the stochastic frontier production function, and the second stage involves the regression of 
those predicted inefficiency effects upon a vector of exogenous firm-specific variables is criticized 
by Kumbhakar et al. (1991); because the distributional assumptions in both steps are inherently   12
 
Following the notation of Hughes et al. (1996), we estimate the following stochastic 
frontier equation:  
            ,                  ,               ,   
 
 
             ,                        ,   
 
             ,      ,           
  , 
  .(5) 
  Where   , ~     , ,  
   and   , ~  0,  
  , and 
     ,            ,                  (6)   
 
In this model, bank return is the dependent variable (output) and risk is assumed to be 
the input variable. We opt for a translog specification when fitting a stochastic upper 
envelope to the returns     of the bank’s portfolio risk      . The   is equal to one, and 
is added to handle negative returns. Equation 5 specifies the risk/return frontier, but Eq. 
6 models the distribution of the mean inefficiency score that is a function of bank-specific 
characteristics. In this study,  we estimate one frontier for the entire panel of Turkish 
banks. STABLE is a proxy for stable periods and is included in the equation to verify 
whether  the  elasticity  of       with  respect  to        changes  in  stable  periods. 
Furthermore,  in  all  specifications,  we  include  year  dummy  variables  to  account  for 
macroeconomic  fluctuations  and  other  year-specific  effects  that  might  influence 
risk/return  characteristics.  The  risk/return  frontier  is  determined  by  the  best-practice 
banks. When a bank does not optimize its portfolio holdings, it will be positioned below 
the risk/return efficient frontier. 
                                                                                                                                                 
inconsistent.  Therefore,  they  propose  a  one-step  stochastic  frontier  model  in  which  the 
parameters are estimated simultaneously with the bank-specific production inefficiency effects. 
Wang and Schmidt (2002) provide persuasive Monte Carlo evidence explaining why both stages 
of the two-stage procedure are seriously biased.   13
 
The composed error term in Eq. 5 equals   ,      ,      , , where   ,  represents 
risk/return efficiency, which is independent and identically distributed with a truncated 
normal  distribution.  The    ,   is  a  two-sided  normal  variable  describing  pure  random 
factors in the return production process, which are beyond the banks’ control. The panel 
structure of the data is exploited using the approach of Battese and Coelli (1995) that  
allows the parameterization of bank-specific efficiencies that vary over time. Both   ,  
and    ,  are time- and bank-specific. Equation 6 introduces location heterogeneity by 
modeling the mean of the technical efficiency component as a function of covariates. 
The Z-vector drives the efficiency averages (m) of bank i at time t and represents bank 
characteristics  such  as  the  human  capital  of  managers  and  employees,  ownership 
status, institution age, political connectedness, off-balance sheet activities, and firm size. 
The   is the estimated coefficient vector of the exogenous variables that influence the 
mean  of  the  truncated  distribution.  Equations  5  and  6  are  estimated  simultaneously 
using the method of maximum likelihood. The parameters  of Eq.  6 indicate  only the 
direction of the effects that the variables have on efficiency levels. A negative parameter 
estimate  shows  that  the  correlate  reduces  the  shortfall  from  the  frontier  and  hence 
improves  the  technical  efficiency.  Following  Wang  (2002),  we  compute  the  marginal 
effect of an exogenous variable    on bank efficiency as:  
        ,              1   Λ         ,          (7) 
where  Λ     ,      , ,        Λ   Φ Λ ,     is  the  normal  density  function  and  Φ  is  the 
normal cumulative-distribution function. The term  1   Λ        in Eq. 7 varies by bank 
and period, but    is constant across banks. Due to the assumption that the variance of 
  ,  is constant, the signs of the coefficients and the signs of their marginal effects on the 
unconditional marginal efficiency are the same.    14
 
2.3 Data and definition of variables 
 
We collect an unbalanced panel of 63 Turkish banks from the various issues of Banks in 
Turkey published by the Banks Association of Turkey. This publication includes balance 
sheets and income and expense statements for these banks from 1988 to 2009. In the 
Appendix, we briefly present an overview of the Turkish banking industry. The unit of 
observation in our analysis is a bank-year pair. Of the 65 banks, 17 banks are branches 
of foreign banks abroad, 17 banks are classified as foreign subsidiaries (more than 50% 
of  their  shares  are  owned  by  non-residents),  42  banks  are  domestically  owned 
commercial banks (more than 50% of their shares are owned by Turkish residents), and 
8  are  classified  as  state-owned  deposit-taking  banks  (predominantly  owned  by  the 
Turkish government).
5 This study concentrates on commercial banks as they operate 
relatively homogenously by providing similar services and using similar resources. The 
sample consists of 928 bank-year observations, excluding investment banks and State 
Deposit Insurance Fund banks (SDIF banks). 
 
Table 1 contains definitions and summary statistics of the variables employed to 
estimate  the  risk/return  frontier  and  to  explain  the  deviations  from  this  best  practice 
frontier.  
< INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> 
Dummy variables are considered in order to capture possible ownership effects:  
       _       is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank is a 
branch of a foreign bank and zero otherwise.        _      is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the bank is predominantly owned by non-residents and zero 
                                                 
5 For some banks we observe a change in ownership type over the sample period.   15
otherwise. The variable        is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
bank is a state-owned bank and zero otherwise.         domestic banks serve as the 
reference  group.  So  far,  empirical  research  has  produced  mixed  results  on  the 
comparative  efficiency  of foreign,  private, and  public  banks  (see, e.g.,  the  survey  by 
Berger and Humphrey 1997). More recent research for a sample of European transition 
countries finds that foreign banks are more cost efficient than their private and public 
counterparts (Bonin et al. 2005),  
 
Next  to  the  ownership  structure,  we  add  several  variables  that  capture  various 
internal corporate-governance aspects. In order to control for the separation between 
ownership and management control, we add a dummy variable           that takes 
the value of one when the chairman of the board is not the same as the CEO and zero 
otherwise. This dispersion is important because CEO duality (CEO as chairman) can 
diminish the monitoring role of the board of directors over the CEO and hence might 
affect firm performance. In the majority of bank-year observations (68.5 %), banks have 
a  non-dual  leadership  structure;  that  is,  they  do  not  vest  the  functions  of  CEO  and 
chairman in the same individual. To control for manager experience,        length, 
we include the cumulative number of years a particular manager has been at the top of 
his or her organization. For the Turkish banks operating during the sample period, the 
average length of time a CEO is in office is about three to four years. As far as we know, 
this is the first study to date that uses this variable to explore the impact of managers’ 
experience on banking efficiency. The above variables on corporate governance and 
ownership are from the Banks Association of Turkey.  
 
Because no publicly available information exists on the education profile of either 
the CEO or the chairman, we hand-collect this information from various sources: annual   16
reports, interviews available on the Internet, company websites, and the online archives 
of various newspapers. Unfortunately, in about 10% (chairmen) and 14% (managers) of 
all cases we are not able to retrieve this information. The dummy variable         
takes the value of one when both the chairman and the CEO have a university degree in 
business,  economics,  or  finance.  Any  other  combination,  including  the  not-reported 
information,  is  given  the  value  of  zero.  By  doing  so,  we  lose  only  9%  of  the 
observations.
6  On  average,  we  observe  that,  in  a  vast  majority  (61.8%)  of  banks, 
business,  finance,  or  economics  graduates  hold  both  the  positions  of  chairman  and 
CEO.  We  conjecture  that  a  chairman  or  CEO  with  a  university  degree  in  business, 
finance,  or  economics  will  be  better  at  creating  value  from  risk  compared  to  their 
counterparts with another degree. 
 
Information  on  political  connections  comes  from  a  variety  of  publicly  available 
sources.  Following  Faccio  (2006),  we  focus  on  ties  between  politicians  and  top 
executives (a bank's CEO or chairman) because they are the most visible to the public. 
The names of top officials come from the various issues of Banks in Turkey published by 
the Banks Association of Turkey. Members of the Turkish parliament come from the 
BELGEnet database. The names of banks’ top officials are cross-checked with cabinet 
ministers’ names and names covered in BELGEnet. Names that match are verified with 
biographies available on the Internet and the online archives of various newspapers. 
Whenever  we  cannot  find  any  information  about  the  banking  experience  of  formerly 
elected parliamentarians, we do not consider those names as politically connected in 
order to avoid overstatements. To summarize the above description:     is a dummy 
                                                 
6 Managers and chairmen whose educational background are not available are typically in charge 
of  relatively  small  institutions.  The  average  total  assets  for  banks  where  information  is  not 
available for both the manager and chairman is  $198 million dollars, whereas  this number is 
about  $3,898  million  dollars  for  banks  showing  the  educational  background  for  both  of  the 
position holders.   17
variable that takes the value of one when a bank’s top executive used to be a member of 
the Turkish Parliament and zero otherwise.
7 
 
The  external  governance  variables  capture  the  different  sources  of  discipline 
exerted  by  shareholders,  debtholders  and  personnel  (Macey  and  O’Hara  2003). 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1988, 1997), especially large shareholders exercise 
disciplining sanctions and pressure management to operate prudently and hence avoid 
failure. We measure the possible discipline exerted by shareholders by the ratio of equity 
to  total  assets     /   .  As  the  Turkish  banking  sector  has  been  traditionally 
characterized  by  a  highly  concentrated  family  ownership  structure,  we  believe  that 
higher stakes of equity in total assets can be an important driver of good governance. In 
line with Schaeck et al. (2011), we use deposits to total assets     /    to capture 
whether debtholders discipline riskier banks. According to Goyal (2005) a high share of 
deposits to total assets can curb managerial flexibility to increase risk and consequently 
force them to achieve a more favorable risk/return efficiency. The      represents the 
average schooling level of the bank's personnel and is computed as the proportion of 
highly schooled employees in the total number of employees. On average, about half of 
the staff (54.4%) holds at least an university degree. 
 
Besides  ownership  structure  and  corporate  governance  attributes,  other  factors 
can also explain the variation in bank risk/return efficiency. The NNII is the proportion of 
net noninterest income to net interest income and captures the bank’s diversification into 
noninterest business. The definition of net noninterest income is the sum of net income 
from  commissions,  net  income  from  foreign  exchange  transactions,  net  income  from 
                                                 
7  We focus on the most objective form of political connections, although there are other indirect 
forms of political connections (ranging from politicians’ relatives on the board to less subtle forms 
such as bribery or corruption) that are difficult to document.     18
capital market transactions, and other noninterest income such as equity participations. 
Net  interest  income  is  generally  about  twice  as  large  as  the  net  noninterest  income 
component. Further, the standard deviation indicates large differences across banks. We 
measure     as the number of years the bank exists. Many studies use bank age as a 
proxy for manager experience. However, we already control for this by including the 
length of tenure. Hence, our proxy for bank age captures reputation and institutional 
memory.  The             is  the  proportion  of  the  bank’s  assets  in  total  banking 
assets and measures market power.  
 
We control for the crisis by constructing a dummy variable that is one for the period 
2001–2009 and zero for the period before 2001. By doing so, we verify whether the 
2000–2001 crisis was a wake-up call for management and regulators. After the crisis, 
Turkey's  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency  redesigned  its  regulatory  and 
supervisory framework to align it more with international standards (EU-directives and 
Basel II). Penas and Tümer-Alkan (2010) empirically confirm that accounting statements 
became more transparent (i.e., elicit more stock price reactions) after the introduction of 
better disclosure requirements. In addition, the lifting of a full blanket guarantee in 2004 
can also be a factor in curbing excessive risk-taking behavior. Hence, we check whether 
the regulatory reform and the response of bank management to the crisis have led to a 
more stable banking sector. Further, the new framework introduced a new approach: 
“Risk  Focused  Monitoring”  in  risk  management  and  changed  the  on-  and  off-site 
supervision techniques. The emphasis lies on better understanding the determination of 
banks’ risk profile and banks’ competency in managing risks instead of avoiding the risk-
taking behavior of banks. The personal responsibilities of shareholders and managers, in 
addition  to  administrative  fines  for  violation  of  regulations  and  judicial  fines,  were 
increased (BAT 2001). The aforementioned arguments warn us to check whether the   19
impact  of corporate  governance  variables  on  banks’  risk/return  efficiency  might  have 
changed after the crisis, as suggested by the theory of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). 
 
 
3 Empirical results 
 
This  paper  assesses  the  interplay  between  corporate  governance  variables  and 
nontraditional  activities before and after the crisis. For the sake of clarity in exposition, 
we first present and discuss the baseline results without interaction terms. Column 1 of 
Table  2  reports  these  results.  Column  2  of  Table  2  presents  the  results  of  the 
specification  with  interaction  terms  between  governance  variables,  net  noninterest 
income,  and  the  crisis  dummy  variable.  In  both  models,  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 
heterogeneity in the one-sided error term is rejected at the usual levels of significance by 
means of a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT). The reported mean-variance relation (panel A) 
is estimated simultaneously with the mean constraint function on     ,   (panel B).  
< INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 
The estimated frontier curve (Eq. 5) has a coefficient of 0.293 on        and - 0.04 on 
        ². Hence, the elasticity of return, R, with respect to risk, RK, amounts to 0.293–
0.08*      .  Hence,  there  are  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  risk,  because  the 
elasticity decreases when RK increases. The coefficient of the interaction term         
       is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This finding indicates that 
bank managers require lower expected returns for holding a risky portfolio in the more 
stable  post-crisis  period.  The  relative  risk/return  efficiency  scores  of  Turkish  banks 
(expressed as a percentage loss with respect to the best performing peer) vary between 
0.159 and 0.958 with a standard deviation of 0.173. The average efficiency score in the 
sample is 0.749, which is comparable with other banking studies (Berger and Humphrey   20
1997). This result implies that the average Turkish bank could achieve 21% more profit 
with the risk it takes. To summarize, a positive coefficient implies that an increase in that 
variable leads to a greater shortfall from the efficient frontier (and hence makes the bank 
less risk/return efficient). 
 
3.1 Sources of technical efficiencies: Internal versus external governance 
 
In panel B of Table 2, we report the estimates of the determinants of Eq. 6:   ,        
∑    , , .  Panel B of Table 2 also reports the sample means of the marginal effect of 
each variable on technical efficiency.
8 
 
Different types of ownership can translate into different portfolio mixes and thus 
differences  in  return  efficiency.  We  do  not  find  a  significant  difference  in  risk/return 
efficiency for foreign or public banks compared to domestic banks. This is in contrast to 
other studies for emerging economies (see, e.g., Isik and Hassan  2003;  Hasan and 
Marton 2003; Karas, Schoors and Weill 2010). They find that foreign banks outperform 
their  domestic  counterparts.  Apparently,  when  controlling  for  a  more  detailed  set  of 
governance variables, this effect is no longer present. 
Larger  banks  and  banks  with  more  market  power  are  usually  more  risk/return 
efficient. The effect is also economically significant. This significance suggests that there 
are  diversification  benefits  to  size.  Larger  banks  manage  their  portfolio  risk  more 
efficiently and reach a more optimal risk/return profile. As Emmons et al. (2004) notice, 
                                                 
8  Marginal  effects  are  obtained  as  in  Eq.  7.  In  order to  compute  the  marginal  effect  of  each 
variable on technical inefficiency, each statistically significant coefficient    is multiplied with the 
weighted average value of  1   Λ       . For example, this term equals 0.183 in column 1. The 
reported mean marginal effects can also be interpreted as the partial effect of    on the total rate 
of return (R) since       , |   , ,        ⁄          , |   , ,        ⁄ , , with k=1,…,K an index of 
exogenous variables. 
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larger banks can have a larger customer base and the overall portfolio is less subject to 
negative credit and liquidity shocks from individual customers. Larger Turkish banks can 
exploit their relative market power, similar to European banks (De Jonghe and Vander 
Vennet 2008). We find that older banks are less efficient than younger banks, which 
indicates that younger banks are better at pursuing profitable investment opportunities. 
However, the coefficient only turns significant in the second column of Table 2.  
 
With regard to internal governance provisions, we find that banks are more efficient 
in transforming risk into return if the chairman is not the same person as the general 
manager             .  A  leadership  structure  that  is  too  heavily  centralized 
compromises  board  independence  and  this  compromise  results  in  poor  performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This finding supports the hypothesis that agency costs are 
lower  when  the  chairman  is  not  an  executive.  To  control  for  the  experience  of  the 
manager, we include the cumulative number of years a manager is at the top of his or 
her organization         . We discover that manager experience boosts risk/return 
efficiency.  Similarly,  Kauko  (2009)  finds  empirical  evidence  about  the  impact  of 
managers’ age and education on performance and cost minimization for Finnish banks.  
Our results suggest that the longer managers are on top of a bank, the more efficient 
they become in transforming risk into return. We do not observe any relation between 
top executives with past political experience       and efficiency, which suggests that 
regulatory forbearance is important rather than the pursuit of private benefits.  
 
Next  to  internal  governance  traits,  we  also  consider  external  governance 
mechanisms. We do not observe that shareholders    /    use their equity stake to put 
pressure on the management to reduce efficiency shortfalls. The benefits of increased 
monitoring  by  (block)  shareholders  are,  apparently,  offset  by  the  creation  of  other   22
agency conflicts such as expropriation of minority shareholders. However, the positive 
coefficient  on  deposits  to  total  assets      /     indicates  that  suboptimal  risk/return 
combinations characterize banks that rely more on deposit finance. Generous deposit 
insurance schemes can explain reduced market monitoring, with higher deposits leading 
to higher risk taking. Acharya et al. (2006) also explain that banks might not show a well-
diversified liability side when they excessively rely on deposits.  Besides the educational 
background  of  the  CEO  and  the  chairman,  we  also  control  for  the  average  level  of 
education across all employees. Because of data limitations only a few studies control 
for a possible efficiency impact from education. In line with the human capital theory 
pioneered  by  Becker  (1962),  we  find  that  banks  with  educated  staff  exhibit  more 
risk/return efficiency. The average marginal effect increases the rate of return by 0.257% 
for  every  1%  increase  in  UNIV.  In  sum,  our  results  indicate  that  acquiring  qualified 
personnel is a good governance strategy. 
 
Next to this detailed set of corporate governance characteristics, we also examine 
the  impact  of  banks'  expansion  of  activities  on  their  risk/return  profile.  In  order  to 
examine  the  impact  of  diversification  into  noninterest  income  brought  forth  by 
nontraditional  activities,  we  consider  the  ratio  of  net  noninterest  income  to  the  net 
interest  income        .  Stiroh  (2004)  notices  that,  for  U.S.  banks,  no  diversification 
benefits exist for engaging in noninterest activities as the net-interest income and the 
noninterest income are increasingly correlated, while noninterest activities are not more 
profitable  than  interest  generating  activities.  Baele  et  al.  (2007)  use  a  sample  of 
European  banks  to  analyze  the  impact  of  functional  diversification  on  bank  risk  and 
return. Our results suggest that diversification into nontraditional activities hampers bank 
efficiency,  presumably  because  the  higher  risk  of  noninterest  businesses  is  not  fully 
compensated for by higher return. However, the effect is not statistically significant.    23
 
3.2 The interplay between corporate governance and risk: pre- and post-crisis evidence 
  
We  examine  the  impact  of  the  2000–2001  banking  crisis  on  risk/return  efficiency  in 
various ways. First, we consider a post-crisis dummy variable          in specifications 
1  and  2.  This  dummy  takes  the  value  of  one  in  the  period  2001–2009  and  zero 
otherwise.  Because the data are recorded at the end of each year, the inclusion of 2001 
in the post-crisis period is permitted because banks lowered their exposure dramatically 
before the end of that year, and because we do not consider SDIF  banks and bankrupt 
banks. The results, in specification 1 suggests that the 2001 crisis indeed served as a 
wake-up  call.  The  estimated  coefficient  of  the            variable  is  negative,  which 
suggests  that  the  overall  efficiency  of  Turkish banks improved  over  time in terms  of 
producing better returns for a given level of risk. This is most likely the consequence of 
the “banking  restructuring  program” implemented  after  2001 that  led  to a  sound  and 
healthy balance sheet for the banking sector (BAT 2010). Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2005) document that the macroeconomic and institutional environment 
plays a key role in systemic stability. The unattractive risk/return efficiency before the 
crisis  might  also  be  due  to  disturbed  incentives  in  the  presence  of  a  full-blanket 
guarantee.  Hence,  the  poor  functioning  of  these  support  structures  before  the  crisis 
might partly explain the inefficiencies in risk management before the crisis. Further, the 
characterization  of the post-crisis  was  as a  benign macroeconomic  environment  with 
higher GDP growth rates and lower inflation.  
 
In  the introduction,  we  hypothesized  that  board  characteristics might  affect firm 
performance  differently  in  boom  periods  and  in  downturns.  Therefore,  we  add  to   24
specification  2  (Table  2) interaction  terms  between  internal  and  external  governance 
traits and the dummy variable capturing the stable post-crisis period.  
These interactions enable us to determine whether these governance factors have 
differential effects on banks’ risk/return efficiency after the crisis.
9 First, we find that the 
impact of the external governance indicators switches signs after the crisis. Before 2001, 
banks with a large capital buffer or that relied largely on deposits for funding were less 
risk/return efficient. After the crisis, banks with sufficient equity and access to a stable 
pool of funds tend to behave better. Hence, external governance only started to play a 
role after the crisis. We find that the crisis period served as a wake-up call for both 
shareholders  and depositors  and made  them more  vigilant against banks’ risk-taking 
positions (as, Karas, Pyle and Schoors 2010 find for the Russian banking sector after 
the Russian crisis of 1998).  
While a more experienced manager (longer tenure) reduces risk/return inefficiency 
before the crisis, we observe the opposite after the crisis. In addition, having a CEO and 
chairman who are trained in economics and finance is beneficial to the bank after the 
crisis.  Hence,  banks  that fired  their  entrenched managers and  replaced  them  with a 
financially literate CEO outperformed their peers in a risk/return sense. In line with the 
theoretical predictions, we observe that before the crisis, banks with political connections 
engaged in excessive risk taking without reaping the gains in terms of higher profits. In 
sum, the role and impact of corporate governance is more pronounced in the post-crisis 
period. 
 
In  column  2  of  Table  2,  we  also  include  interaction  terms  between  corporate 
governance  variables  and  the  variable  capturing  the  noninterest  income  component 
(NNII). The purpose is to verify which corporate governance traits amplify or mitigate the 
                                                 
9 We could not include an interaction with the politically connectedness dummy because, in the 
post-crisis period, no top executive exists that used to be a member of the Turkish parliament.   25
effects of off-balance sheet products on risk/return efficiency. This verification will also 
shed light on why different empirical studies obtain different results regarding the impact 
of diversification on risk and return.  
For  example,  before  the  crisis,  no  independent impact  from  NNII  on  risk/return 
efficiency exists. Nevertheless, a strategic refocus towards noninterest income is more 
favorable for banks with a high deposit to asset ratio and where CEO-chairman duality 
exists. In terms of CEO-chairman non-duality (         ), we still find that banks are 
more efficient in transforming risk into return. An independent increase in      has no 
effect  on  risk/return  efficiency  because  the  opposing  effects  of  interaction  variables 
capture  the  negative  effect,  in  particular  the  interaction  between               and 
    .  For  example,  a  one  standard-deviation  increase  in  NNII  (equal  to  1.284)  is 
sufficient to turn non-duality into a drawback. Apparently, the positive effects from non-
duality are mitigated when the bank has diversified into nontraditional banking activities 
that  generate  noninterest  income.  This  mitigation  might  be  related  to  the  degree  of 
opacity of these activities, which are harder to value and make it hence more difficult to 
monitor  and  discipline  the  manager.  These  results  suggest  that  the  impact  of  the 
governance structure on risk/return efficiency is multifaceted, depends on the complexity 
of operations, and on the macroeconomic and institutional environment.  
 
Furthermore, by adding triple-interaction terms, whereby the interaction terms are 
multiplied by the dummy covering the period after the crisis, we can analyze whether the 
period after the crisis influences the impact of these variables on the risk/return structure 
of banks. The triple-interaction term                            shows that, after 
the  crisis,  banks  with  a  non-dual  governance  structure  handle  the  off-balance  sheet 
component in a more appropriate manner. Specifically, the impact of NNII in combination 
with CHA≠CEO increases the inefficiency (coefficient = 0.330, mean marginal effect =   26
0.091). So, dual leadership is better in venturing with NNII. However, after the crisis, we 
observe that CHA≠CEO is more efficient in dealing with NNII (adding up coefficients = 
0.330–0.679; adding up mean marginal effects = 0.091 – 0.192). This result shows that 
dual leadership performs worse after the crisis. This is in line with the hypothesis that a 
negative  economic  shock  alters  the  relation  between  board  characteristics  and  bank 
efficiency for complex product segments. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that the 
introduction of a more effective regulatory and supervisory environment might change 
the relation between governance duality and the efficient management of off-balance 
sheet operations. Prior to the collapse of the sector, the problem of moral hazard was 
more  profound  for  banks  that  separate  the  CEO  and  chairman  positions.  As  the 
chairman is typically the majority shareholder in Turkish banking, risk aversion into non-
balance sheet activities of dual banks might be at the basis of more favorable risk/return 
combinations. This novel finding that the valuation effect of the leadership structure is 
not only conditional on product complexity, but also on the environment and regulatory 
framework might illuminate the incoherencies reported in the CEO-chairman literature. 
Overall, our results suggest that, in weak regulatory environments, the monitoring role of 
the board is hampered in opaque segments (Prendergast 2000; Raheja 2005) of the 
banking business and that the level of board monitoring fluctuates over time, driven by 
developments in regulatory environment and/or economic shocks (see, Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1998; Adams et al. (2010); Romano 2005).  
While  a  business-trained  executive  (BUSECON)  did  not  improve  risk/return 
efficiency, it clearly does so in the more stable post-crisis period, especially if the bank 
chooses to invest in noninterest income activities. Moreover, in the post-crisis period, an 
expansion into non-traditional banking activities is also more desirable for banks with a 
high deposit to asset ratio or more educated staff. 
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The following two-by-two matrix illustrates that the impact of noninterest income on 
risk/return efficiency varies with different contingencies. The columns represent the pre- 
and post-crisis case. The rows correspond with a situation where the skills are either low 
(CEO  has  no  business  education  and  UNIV  at  mean  value  minus  one  standard 
deviation) or high (CEO with business degree and skilled labor force, i.e. mean plus one 
standard deviation). 
Impact of NNII on  
risk/return inefficiency 
Pre-Crisis  Post- Crisis 
Low Skilled  Not  significant  1.80 
High Skilled  Not  significant  -0.40 
 
Our  full  model  shows  that  in  the  post  crisis  period,  banks  with  inexperienced 
managers face difficulties in achieving risk/return efficiency, whereas banks where both 
CEO and Chairman have a degree in business, finance or economics can handle the 
diversification more efficiently. In the management of non-traditional activities, only in the 
stable post-crisis period, banks with both CEO and Chairman having a finance training 
are more capable of managing the risks inherent to the off-balance sheet business.  
 
Hence,  this  offers  a  first  indication  of  why  different  studies  can  obtain  seemingly 
conflicting evidence. Depending on the macro- and institutional environment and/or a 
corporate  governance  characteristics,  we  find  either  a  negative,  positive,  or 
nonsignificant impact of noninterest income on performance. 
 
4 Additional analyses 
   28
We perform a number of additional analyses. First, we use an alternative proxy to define 
crisis periods. While the crisis of 2000–2001 was the most severe one, it is not the only 
disruption to the Turkish financial system over the sample period. Therefore, we redefine 
the variable        by constructing a stability index based on IMF interventions. For 
each year t, we compute the net flow of payments from Turkey to the IMF. If repayments 
exceed the amount of disbursement, then this measure is positive. We rescale the net 
flows  by  dividing  the  time  series  with  the  maximum  observed  net-flow  (in  absolute 
value). The        indicator is -1 in the most risky year and between   1;1  in every 
other year. The data for repayments and disbursements between IMF and Turkey are 
obtained from the IMF’s website. According to this index, the most unstable year was in 
2001, while the most stable year was recorded in 2005. In Table 3, we re-estimate the 
specifications reported in Table 2 where the only change is the definition of the stability 
indicator.  
< INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE> 
Column 1 of Table 3 confirms the main findings as reported in Table 2. In stable periods 
banks operate more efficiently. Larger banks, more mature CEOs, a separation between 
the CEO and chairman, and better trained staff lead to greater efficiencies. Compared to 
the  results  of  Table  2,  the  inefficiency  of  banks  with  politically  connected  leadership 
(POL) is more pronounced. This significance might be due to regulatory forbearance 
granted to politically connected banks by regulatory agencies or to the pursuit of private 
benefits and perks by politically connected bankers (Imai 2009). 
Concerning  column  2,  the  results  are  most  robust  for  CEO  duality  and  its 
interactions  with  NNII  and  STABLE,  indicating  that  banks  with  CEO  duality  fare 
differently  in  stable  and  unstable  periods  in  dealing  with  opaque  bank  instruments. 
Coefficients that are significant both in Table 2 and 3 have the same sign and are of 
similar magnitude. However, fewer significant relations exist for the interactions with the   29
stability indicator in Table 3. The root cause for this drop in the number of significant 
relations is that in Table 2 we look at a pre- and post-crisis effect, whereas in Table 3 we 
use a crisis intensity indicator. The IMF rescue package was extremely large in 2001 
compared to the other years in which Turkey received an IMF contribution. In addition, 
the repayments occur in relatively small amounts. As such the stability indicator in Table 
3 measures how the relations alter during the crisis, whereas Table 2 provides more 
insight in how the relations alter after the crisis.  
 
As  a  robustness  check,  we  allow  for  time  variation  in  the  variance-covariance 
matrix used in the calculation of portfolio risk. In the previous specifications, full sample 
period returns of each asset and liability are used to estimate the covariance matrix. This 
means that heterogeneity in bank risk (RK) for a particular bank over the estimation 
period  is  solely  originated  by  the  actual  chosen  portfolio  allocations  across  banking 
assets (i.e., the assets weights). We relax this assumption and allow for time variation in 
the variance-covariance matrix. We use a historical five year rolling window to track the 
moving  correlation  between  asset  classes  and  the  moving  standard  deviation  of  the 
asset classes in order to construct a time-varying variance-covariance matrix. As we use 
a five year rolling window the estimation period for the robustness model now only starts 
from 1993. 
< INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE> 
The  estimation  results  for  frontier  and  efficiency  correlations  are  presented  in 
specifications 1 and 2 in Table 4. We focus now on the full model; that is, we use the 
same correlations as in specification 2 of Table 2 and Table 3. In column 1 of Table 4 
where  we  employ  the  post-crisis  dummy,  the  relative  risk/return  efficiency  scores  of 
Turkish banks vary between 0.126 and 0.979 with a standard deviation of 0.161. The 
average efficiency score is 0.837 that is higher than 0.789; the mean efficiency score   30
obtained in specification 2 of Table 2. This score might be due to the shorter sample. But 
does  suggests  that,  on  average,  efficiency  increased  over  the  period.  Although  still 
negative, the quadratic term in the frontier equation is no longer significant, which is 
probably due to the smaller dataset, while the interaction term                is still 
significantly negative. More importantly, the sign of the correlations in specification 1 are 
still comparable with the findings observed in specification 2 of Table 2, which confirms 
the robustness of this framework in efficiency studies. This is also the case in model 2 of 
Table 4, where we define        as the IMF stability index. Across specifications, we 
find confirmation for the finding that splitting the positions of chairman and CEO has a 
relation to  dealing with the off-balance sheet component more risk/return efficiently in 
stable periods. 
 
The previous results suggest that the combination between net noninterest income 
and  corporate  governance  can  have  different  effects  on  the  risk/return  efficiency 
depending on product complexity, the macroeconomic environment, and the regulatory 
framework. 
This is important for a better understanding of why different studies tend to find 
conflicting evidence on the impact of diversification on risk and risk-adjusted returns. As 
an  extension,  we  examine  the  separate  interactions  between  different  internal 
governance  characteristics  and  the different components  of  noninterest income.  This 
examination allows us to explore not only the differential impact of  off-balance sheet 
components  on  efficiency  but  also  whether  the  corporate  governance  characteristics 
have a mitigating or an amplifying role on the components’ effects.
10 Further, we also 
                                                 
10 Off-balance sheet operations of Turkish banks expanded enormously in the 1990s as a result 
of the increase in repo transactions and foreign exchange hedging instruments.  Because the 
Turkish  lira  was  pegged,  the  banking  sector  viewed  the  exchange  risk  limited,  many  banks 
borrowed in foreign exchange and lent in domestic currency (mainly to the Treasury), thus taking 
advantage of the uncovered interest rate parity. The floating of the Turkish lira eventually fatally 
hit  the  sector  because  of  the  huge  exposure  in  the  forward  foreign  exchange  market.  This   31
verify whether the crisis has altered the relation between leadership structure and off-
balance sheet components relative to efficiency.   
 
Net  noninterest  income  is  the  sum  of  COMM  (net  commissions  income;  e.g., 
provision  of  guarantees  and  payment  transactions),  CAPM  (net  income  from  capital 
market transactions; e.g., derived from equities, bonds, and derivatives trading), FX (net 
income  from  foreign  exchange  transactions),  and  other  noninterest  income  primarily 
derived from equity participations. Compared to model 2 in Table 2, we run a new set of 
regressions in which all the single correlates correlations except NNII are preserved. For 
the sake of space, we only report the interactions between different components of the 
noninterest income activities and a separate proxy of leadership structure (i.e.,      
   ,        and        , reported in specifications 1, 2, and 3 respectively of Table 
5). All of these off-balance sheet components are divided by net interest income. Our 
results show that the relation between governance traits and dealing with off balance-
sheet components is complex and, in addition, changes with changes in the regulatory 
and economic environment. 
< INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE> 
In general, we find that if the coefficient of a triple-interaction term is significant, it is 
always negative. An increase in each of the three considered governance variables (i.e., 
separation of CEO and chairman positions, more experienced CEO, and a financially 
skilled leadership team) is supposed to mitigate the agency problems associated with a 
separation between ownership and control. Hence, in the post-crisis period, a bank with 
sounder  corporate  governance  is  more  efficient  in  creating  value  from  riskier, 
nontraditional  activities.  Specifically,  in  specification  1  of  Table  5,  we  verify  whether 
                                                                                                                                                 
situation has apparently completely reversed after the crisis, resulting in improved off-balance 
sheet operations.  
   32
CHA≠CEO  in  combination  with  the  noninterest  income  components  reflects 
heterogeneous  effects  on  bank  efficiency.  After  the  crisis,  a  separate  governance 
structure  (CHA≠CEO)  further  increased  the  risk/return  efficiency  of  banks  by 
appropriately charging for services through fees and commissions (COMM) and better  
balancing their capital market (CAPM) and foreign exchange (FX) exposure. Estimates 
in  Table  5  (specification  2),  which  reflect  the  interactions  between  TENURE  and 
noninterest income items, also suggest an improvement in the collection of fees and 
commissions  after  the  crisis.  For  the  whole  period,  we  furthermore  notice  that  the 
efficient management of capital market  transactions is weaker for banks whose CEOs 
have  a  long  tenure.  This  result  suggests  that  managers  with  a  longer  tenure  need 
suitable  training  in  order  to  cope  with  this  complex  segment  of  off-balance-sheet 
operations. Finally, the results of model 3 in Table 4, replicate the interactions between 
BUSECON  and  the  income  from  off-balance-sheet  components.  Surprisingly,  banks 
where both the CEO and chairman have business degrees are less efficient in dealing 
with noninterest income from foreign exchange transactions. However, this situation is 




The financial sector, and in particular the banking sector, plays a key role in allocating 
the financial resources of the economy through intermediation, maturity transformation, 
and  facilitating  payment  flows.  In  order  to  ensure  the  safety  and  soundness  of  the 
banking system, regulators and supervisors conduct on-site and off-site reviews to curb 
banks’ risk taking on a permanent basis. However, not all risk taking is imprudent and 
some banks are better at coping with the risks they take than others. To measure this 
ability to cope requires not only an estimation of the risk/return efficiency rankings, but   33
also an exploration of the determinants of risk/return efficiency. Knowing the drivers of 
risk/return efficiency is not only of interest to regulators, who want to prevent banks from 
boosting  profits  by  taking  on  too  much  risk,  but  also  is  of  vital  importance  to  bank 
management because future regulatory limits to banks’ risk taking will force banks to 
become more risk/return efficient . 
 
This paper uses a stochastic frontier approach to estimate an efficient risk/return 
frontier for commercial banks operating in Turkey between 1988 and 2009. We explain a 
large  proportion  of  the  variation  in  efficiency  across  banks.  Private  domestic  banks 
outperform public and foreign bank branches in terms of return efficiency. The presence 
of a more experienced CEO generally increases risk/return efficiency, as suggested by 
human-capital theory.  Larger banks also tend to be more risk/return efficient, which 
might be related to the more varied menu of risk/return choices that follows from their 
size or from their market power. Banks whose chairman has a political background tend 
to have lower rather than higher risk/return efficiency. With respect to off-balance-sheet 
activities,  the  diversification  to  noninterest  income  affects  risk/return  efficiency 
negatively.  As  regards  external  governance,  suboptimal  risk/return  combinations 
characterize banks that rely more on deposit finance, while the opposite holds for banks 
with a better educated staff. 
 
The 2000–2001 financial crisis served as a wake-up call for the sector, as banks’ 
allocative decisions in the post-crisis period succeeded in achieving higher risk/return 
efficiency. In addition we find that CEO non-duality, staff education level, and a business 
education of the CEO and/or the chairman all relate to much better risk/return efficiency 
in  the  post-crisis  period  for  banks  that  are  actively  involved  in  noninterest-income 
activities. The opposite holds for CEO’s with long tenures. This is in line with the idea   34
that the relation between corporate governance traits and risk/return efficiency can differ 
with  economic  environments,  regulatory  and  supervisory  environments  and  bank 
models. Traits that we usually associate with good corporate governance seem to be all 
the more important for the risk/return efficiency of banks that are engaged in complex 
and  opaque  activities  if  regulation  and  supervision  are  tight  enough.  The  impact  of 
noninterest income on bank efficiency can be either positive, negative, or nonexistent 
depending  on  the  macroeconomic  and  institutional  environment  and  on  corporate 
governance mechanisms. This impact is in line with the theory that the monitoring role of 
the board is hampered in uncertain segments of banking if regulatory environments are 
weak  (Prendergast,  2000)  and  provides  a  rationale  for  the  sometimes  conflicting 
empirical evidence on the relation between diversification and bank performance. 
 
Our most robust findings concern CEO non-duality. We find that CEO non-duality 
generally helps banks to attain a higher risk/return efficiency. Specifically for noninterest-
opaque bank activities, CEO non-duality does not lead to more risk/return efficiencies in 
the pre-crisis period, while it clearly does in the post-crisis period. These findings are in 
line  with  the  predictions  of  the  Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1998)  model  that  predicts 
endogenously much more monitoring by independent boards after a negative shock, but 
the findings  also  contribute  to  this model  by  more  explicitly adding  the dimension of 
product complexity.  
 
Our results also yield an interesting message for the debate on financial reform in 
the  aftermath  of  the  2008–2009  financial  crisis,  a  crisis  that  was  indeed  fuelled  by 
grotesque  overinvestment  in  opaque  and  complex  noninterest  products.  Our findings 
suggest  that  strict  regulation  in  combination  with  improved  board  structure  and 
composition might go a long way to improve the risk/return profile of banks that are   35
engaged in opaque and complex noninterest activities. The more general message is 
that  the  relation  between  corporate  governance  traits  and  risk/return  profiles  is 
conditional  on  product  complexity  and  the  economic,  regulatory,  and  supervisory 
environment.     36
 Table 1 Summary statistics of the covariates of risk/return efficiency of Turkish banks for the period 
1988–2009. 
Variables Definition of the variable Mean Std.dev.
Frontier equation
ln(R)  The return of bank’s portfolio measured as ln(1+R) 0.673 0.496
ln(RK)
The standard deviation of the bank’s portfolio 
measured as ln(RK) 0.524 1.049
Inefficiency correlates
FOREIGN_OWNED
Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank is predominantly 
owned by non residents (> 50%) and 0 otherwise 0.143 0.350
FOREIGN_BRANCH
Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank is a branch of a 
foreign bank and 0 otherwise 0.231 0.422
PUBLIC
Dummy variable equals 1 if the Turkish government 
has a majority stake in the bank and 0 otherwise 0.099 0.299
BANKSHARE A bank’s market share in total banking market assets 0.021 0.038
AGE The number of years the bank exists 38.041 32.735
STABLE




Dummy variable equals 1 if the chairman of the board 
is not the same person as the CEO and 0 otherwise 0.685 0.465
TENURE The number of years the bank manager is in charge 3.533 3.094
BUSECON
Dummy variable equals 1 when chairman and CEO 
both have a university degree in business, 




Dummy variable equals 1 if the board chairman or 
CEO was previously a member of the Turkish 
parliament and 0 otherwise
0.004 0.062
NNII
The proportion of the net noninterest income to the net 
interest income 0.425 1.284
External governance
EQ/TA Equity divided to total assets 0.110 0.208
DEP/TA Deposits divided to total assets 0.534 0.277
UNIV
Educated personnel (university or PhD degree) as a 
proportion of the total number of personnel 0.544 0.192
 
Note: This table contains summary statistics of the covariates of risk/return efficiency of Turkish banks for the period 
1988–2009. The data come from various sources. Balance sheet and income statement data come from the website of 
the Banks Association of Turkey. The names of Bank top officials are gathered from the various issues of Banks in Turkey 
published by the Banks Association of Turkey. Members of the Turkish parliament come from the BELGEnet database. 
Information on the CEO's education profile comes from company websites and the online archives of various newspapers. 
The sample  consists of 928 bank-year observations, excluding  Investment banks and  State Deposit Insurance Fund 
banks (SDIF banks).   Table 2  Corporate governance, noninterest income, and performance: pre- and post-crisis evidence.  
(1) (2)
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
Panel A: Frontier equation
Constant 0.841*** (14.52) 0.870*** (14.16)
ln(RK) 0.293*** (12.67) 0.272*** (11.33)
(ln(RK))² -0.04*** (-4.15) -0.038*** (-3.94)
ln(RK)*STABLE -0.118*** (-3.66) -0.115*** (-3.56)
(ln(RK))²*STABLE 0.001 (-0.01) 0.003 (0.23)
Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev. Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev.
Panel B: Inefficiency correlates
Constant -0.126 (-0.20) -0.017 (-0.04)
FOREIGN_OWNED 0.156 (-0.70) 0.077 (0.49)
FOREIGN_BRANCH -0.138 (-0.49) 0.142 (0.71)
PUBLIC 0.301 (1.06) 0.323* (1.77) 0.089 (0.081)
BANKSHARE -8.564** (-2.14) -1.567 (1.123) -5.01** (-2.48) -1.378 (1.254)
AGE 0.004 (1.59) 0.003* (1.91) 0.001 (0.001)
STABLE -1.004*** (-2.60) -0.184 (0.132) 1.708 (1.29)
Internal governance
CHA≠CEO -0.538** (-2.12) -0.098 (0.071) -0.315** (-2.08) -0.087 (0.079)
TENURE -0.103** (-2.18) -0.019 (0.014) -0.076** (-2.43) -0.021 (0.019)
BUSECON -0.186 (-1.21) -0.153 (-1.44)
POL 1.166 (1.43) 0.824* (1.70) 0.226 (0.206)
NNII 0.059 (1.27) 0.025 (0.12)
External governance
EQ/TA 1.220 (1.55) 1.070* (1.96) 0.294 (0.268)
DEP/TA 1.358** (2.06) 0.248 (0.178) 1.211*** (2.8) 0.333 (0.303)
UNIV -1.406** (-2.14) -0.257 (0.184) -0.975** (-2.49) -0.268 (0.244)
Interaction variables
(CHA≠CEO)*STABLE -0.573 (-1.32)
TENURE*STABLE 0.134* (1.70) 0.037 (0.034)
BUSECON*STABLE -1.393** (-2.14) -0.383 (0.349)
NNII*STABLE 2.406*** (2.93) 0.662 (0.602)
(EQ/TA)*STABLE -4.891** (-2.01) -1.345 (1.224)
(DEP/TA)*STABLE -2.572* (-1.86) -0.707 (0.644)
UNIV*STABLE -0.880 (-0.66)




(DEP/TA)*NNII -0.39* (-1.94) -0.107 (0.098)
UNIV*NNII 0.098 (0.51)
(CHA≠CEO)*NNII*STABLE -0.699*** (-3.14) -0.192 (0.175)
TENURE*NNII*STABLE 0.075 (1.48)
BUSECON*NNII*STABLE -1.377*** (-2.90) -0.378 (0.344)
(EQ/TA)*NNII*STABLE -1.045 (-1.08)
(DEP/TA)*NNII*STABLE -1.078* (-1.87) -0.296 (0.27)
UNIV*NNII*STABLE -2.052*** (-3.24) -0.564 (0.513)
Regression diagnostics 0 (0)





















Panel  A  reports  the  estimates  of  the  stochastic  return  (R)  and  risk  (RK)  frontier:          ,                  ,               ,   
 
 
        ,                        ,   
 
             ,      , . The variable STABLE is a dummy that equals one as of 2000 and is added 
to control for a shift in the frontier after the crisis. The    is equal to one, and is added to control for negative returns. The   ,  is the 
traditional random noise component.  The term   ,  , which is non-negative, represents the risk/return inefficiency and is independent and 
identically distributed with a truncated normal distribution. Year dummies are included in all regressions (with 1988 as the reference period) 
but their coefficient estimates are omitted. Coefficients’ z-Statistics are in parentheses. Panel B presents the estimates of the equation: 
  ,         ∑    , , . The Z vector drives the inefficiency averages (m) of bank i at time t and represents bank characteristics as described 
in Table 1. For each model, both equations are estimated simultaneously using the method of maximum likelihood. Coefficients’ z-Statistics 
are in parentheses. The mean marginal effects correspond with the estimated results of the coefficients (only  if P <  0.10); standard 
deviations of marginal effects are reported in parentheses; NA = not applicable because the estimated coefficient of the correlate is not 
statistically significant.     38
Table 3 An alternative crisis indicator: IMF Stability Index. 
(1) (2)
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
Panel A: Frontier equation
Constant 0.809*** (15.94) 0.808*** (15.66)
ln(RK) 0.224*** (13.13) 0.221*** (13.33)
(ln(RK))² -0.036*** (-4.82) -0.035*** (-4.83)
ln(RK)*STABLE -0.212*** (-4.11) -0.204*** (-3.87)
(ln(RK))²*STABLE 0.008 (0.31) -0.010 (-0.40)
Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev. Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev.
Panel B: Inefficiency correlates
Constant -0.067 (-0.09) 0.354 (0.78)
FOREIGN_OWNED 0.151 (0.53) 0.178 (0.86)
FOREIGN_BRANCH -0.098 (-0.29) 0.272 (1.04)
PUBLIC 0.505 (1.38) 0.434* (1.87) 0.089 (0.078)
BANKSHARE -13.515** (-2.34) -1.975 (1.588) -7.432*** (-2.75) -1.518 (1.344)
AGE 0.004 (1.45) 0.002 (1.10)
STABLE -1.408*** (-2.77) -0.206 (0.165) 0.749 (0.54)
Internal governance
CHA≠CEO -0.518* (-1.85) -0.076 (0.061) -0.303 (-1.63)
TENURE -0.128** (-2.27) -0.019 (0.015) -0.106*** (-2.72) -0.022 (0.019)
BUSECON -0.240 (-1.30) -0.237* (-1.76) -0.048 (0.043)
POL 2.119** (2.00) 0.31 (0.249) 1.673*** (2.61) 0.342 (0.303)
NNII 0.083 (1.51) 0.029 (0.13)
External governance
EQ/TA 0.747 (0.90) 0.448 (0.78)
DEP/TA 1.488* (1.88) 0.217 (0.175) 1.164** (2.38) 0.238 (0.211)




BUSECON*STABLE 0.151 (0.34) 0.031 (0.027)









UNIV*NNII -0.639** (-2.41) -0.13 (0.116)





UNIV*NNII*STABLE -4.045*** (-3.42) -0.826 (0.732)
Regression diagnostics










































Panel  A  reports  the  estimates  of  the  stochastic  return  (R)  and  risk  (RK)  frontier:          ,                  ,               ,   
 
 
        ,                        ,   
 
             ,      , . The variable STABLE is an IMF indicator variable representing stability and 
is calculated as           
        
|            | with            1;1  . For each year t, we compute net flow = repayment – disbursement. The   
is equal to one, and is included to control for negative returns. The   ,  is the traditional random noise component.  The term   ,  , which is 
non-negative, represents the risk/return inefficiency and is independent and identically distributed with a truncated normal distribution. Year 
dummies are included in all regressions (with 1988 as the reference period) but their coefficient estimates are omitted. Coefficients’ z-
Statistics are in parentheses. Panel B presents the estimates of the equation:   ,         ∑    , , . The Z vector drives the inefficiency 
averages (m) of bank i at time t and represents bank characteristics as described in Table 1. For each model, both equations are estimated 
simultaneously  using  the  method  of  maximum  likelihood.  Coefficients’  z-Statistics  are  in  parentheses.  The  mean  marginal  effects   39
correspond  with  the  estimated  results  of  the  coefficients  (only  if  P  <  0.10);  standard  deviations  of  marginal  effects  are  reported  in 
parentheses; NA = not applicable because the estimated coefficient of the correlate is not statistically significant. Table 4 Time-variant covariance matrix to compute bank risk 
(1) (2)
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
Panel A: Frontier equation
Constant 1.38*** (28.37) 1.376*** (27.3)
ln(RK) 0.315*** (16.71) 0.171*** (12.91)
(ln(RK))² -0.003 (-0.28) 0.011* (1.75)
ln(RK)*STABLE -0.256*** (-11.38) -0.273*** (-7.44)
(ln(RK))²*STABLE -0.009 (-0.72) -0.041* (-1.93)
Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev. Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev.
Panel B: Inefficiency correlates
Constant -0.357 (-0.42) 0.071 (0.13)
FOREIGN_OWNED -0.626 (-1.51) -0.186 (-0.81)
FOREIGNX_BRANCH -0.319 (-0.86) -0.002 (-0.01)
PUBLIC 0.469 (1.39) 0.348 (1.27)
BANKSHARE -14.866** (-2.38) -2.209 (2.997) -8.805*** (-2.68) -1.927 (1.669)
AGE 0.005 (1.57) 0.005** (2.2) 0.001 (0.001)
STABLE 1.464 (0.64) 2.18 (1.25)
Internal governance
CHA≠CEO -0.804** (-2.55) -0.119 (0.162) -0.392* (-1.81) -0.086 (0.074)
TENURE -0.213*** (-2.62) -0.032 (0.043) -0.139*** (-2.69) -0.03 (0.026)
BUSECON -0.487** (-2.13) -0.072 (0.098) -0.251 (-1.62)
POL 1.344** (2.07) 0.2 (0.271) 1.793*** (2.74) 0.392 (0.34)
NNII -0.639 (-1.01) -0.008 (-0.02)
External governance
EQ/TA 2.645** (2.41) 0.393 (0.533) 1.197* (1.84) 0.262 (0.227)
DEP/TA 1.915** (2.16) 0.285 (0.386) 1.129** (2.11) 0.247 (0.214)
UNIV -0.6 (-0.97) -1.31** (-2.44) -0.287 (0.248)
Interaction variables
(CHA≠CEO)*STABLE -0.016 (-0.02) -0.407 (-0.88)
TENURE*STABLE 0.221 (1.42) -0.093 (-1.29)
BUSECON*STABLE -1.734 (-0.98) -0.628 (-1.39)
NNII*STABLE 3.175* (1.92) 0.472 (0.64) -1.472 (-0.89)
(EQ/TA)*STABLE -3.858 (-1.06) -1.584 (-0.81)
(DEP/TA)*STABLE -2.522 (-1.15) -1.466 (-1.03)
UNIV*STABLE -1.916 (-0.84) -1.286 (-0.77)
(CHA≠CEO)*NNII 0.714*** (3.39) 0.106 (0.144) 0.224* (1.66) 0.049 (0.043)
TENURE*NNII 0.101** (2.3) 0.015 (0.02) 0.065** (2.02) 0.014 (0.012)
BUSECON*NNII 0.292** (2.25) 0.043 (0.059) 0.154 (1.35)
(EQ/TA)*NNII -0.374 (-0.61) -0.22 (-0.52)
(DEP/TA)*NNII -0.11 (-0.21) 0.045 (0.14)
UNIV*NNII 0.184 (0.48) -0.793** (-2.24) -0.174 (0.15)
(CHA≠CEO)*NNII*STABLE -0.851** (-2.13) -0.126 (0.172) -0.935** (-2.27) -0.205 (0.177)
TENURE*NNII*STABLE -0.159* (-1.72) -0.024 (0.032) 0.065 (1.07)
BUSECON*NNII*STABLE -2.489** (-2.48) -0.37 (0.502) 0.779 (1.6)
(EQ/TA)*NNII*STABLE -0.081 (-0.06) -0.378 (-0.37)
(DEP/TA)*NNII*STABLE -0.566 (-0.59) 1.378* (1.83) 0.302 (0.261)
UNIV*NNII*STABLE -2.267* (-1.76) -0.337 (0.457) -0.467 (-0.24)
Regression diagnostics
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The set-up mimics the full model 4 of Table 2 and Table 3.  The difference stems from the measurement of 
risk in the frontier equation. In the previous models, time variation in bank risk was solely due to portfolio 
reallocations (at the bank level) while keeping the riskiness of each activity constant. In this table, by using a 
historical five-year rolling window to track the moving correlation between asset classes and the moving 
standard deviation of the asset classes, we allow for a time-variant covariance matrix of the returns on the 
various  bank  activities  Panel  A  reports  the  estimates  of  the  equation: ln θ   R ,     β    β ln RK ,   
β   ln RK ,   
 
  β ln RK ,     STABLE   β   ln RK ,   
 
  STABLE   v ,    u , . The term u ,  represents the risk/return 
inefficiency that is independent and identically distributed with a truncated normal distribution. The v , is a 
two-sided normal variable describing pure random factors in the return production process.  Year dummies 
are included in all regressions (with 1993 as the reference period) but their coefficient estimates are omitted. 
Coefficients’  z-Statistics  are  in  parentheses.  Panel  B  presents  the  estimates  of  equation:   m ,    δ   
∑δ Z , , . In model 1, STABLE is the post-crisis dummy variable equal to one after the year 2000 and zero 
otherwise, while in model 2 STABLE represents the IMF Stability Index and is calculated as          
 
        
|            | with            1;1  . When calculating STABLE in model 2, for each year t, we compute 
net flow = repayment – disbursement.  For each model, both equations are estimated simultaneously using 
the method of maximum likelihood. Coefficients’ z-Statistics are in parentheses. The mean marginal effects 
correspond with the estimated results of the coefficients (only if P < 0.10); standard deviations of marginal 
effects are reported in parentheses; NA = not applicable because the estimated coefficient of the correlate 
was not statistically significant. Table 5 A detailed decomposition of noninterest income. 
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev. Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev. Coef. z-Stat. Observed Stdev.
(CHA≠CEO)*COMM 1.094** (2.17) 0.186 (0.171)
(CHA≠CEO)*FX 0.178 (1.51)
(CHA≠CEO)*CAPM 0.239 (1.35)
(CHA≠CEO)*COMM*STABLE -0.987* (-1.72) -0.168 (0.155)
(CHA≠CEO)*FX*STABLE -0.486* (-1.67) -0.082 (0.076)
(CHA≠CEO)*CAPM*STABLE -1.154*** (-3.01) -0.196 (0.181)
TENURE*COMM 0.017 (1.62)
TENURE*FX 0.02 (1.62)
TENURE*CAPM 0.089** (2.2) 0.019 (0.014)




BUSECON*FX 0.092* (1.67) 0.016 (0.014)
BUSECON*CAPM 0.076 (0.9)
BUSECON*COMM*STABLE 0.632 (1.01)
BUSECON*FX*STABLE -1.023*** (-2.69) -0.181 (0.154)
BUSECON*CAPM*STABLE -2.453** (-1.97) -0.435 (0.369)
Regression diagnostics
Observations
Loglikelihood    
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This table analyzes the interplay between different CEO attributes and subcomponents of noninterest income. We decompose NNII in its components: net commissions income (COMM), net 
income from capital market transactions (CAPM), and  net income from foreign exchange transactions(;FX). Each component is interacted with a CEO characteristic  (i.e., CHA≠CEO, TENURE, 
and BUSECON reported respectively in specification 1, 2, and 3). By adding triple interaction terms, we also verify whether the crisis has altered the relation between risk/return efficiency and 
leadership structure and off-balance-sheet components. The variable STABLE is the post-crisis dummy and equals one after the year 2000 and zero otherwise. Coefficients’ z-Statistics are in 
parentheses; the mean marginal effects correspond with the estimated results of the coefficients (only if P < 0.10); standard deviations of marginal effects are reported in parentheses; NA = not 
applicable because the estimated coefficient of the correlate was not statistically significant. Control variables are included but not reported for sake of space.  
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Appendix: Turkish banking sector 
 
The financial liberalization process in the 1980s abolished interest rate ceilings, removed 
quantitative controls on lending, lifted entry barriers, and liberated the capital market. 
The expectation was that liberalization would urge banks to operate more efficiently and 
would stimulate capital inflows, both boosting economic growth. On the other hand, the 
increased level of competition that ensued from this premature financial liberalization 
has  often  been  blamed  for  perverting  banks’  incentives  to  behave  in  a  risk-averse 
manner. Especially in the presence of bailout expectations, deregulation can hamper 
financial stability as banks are confronted with declining franchise values (the discounted 
stream of future expected cash flows diminishes), which distorts their incentives in the 
direction of excessive risk taking (Keeley 1990).   
 
Even  after  abolishing  the financial  constraints  the  government  continued  to  put 
indirect pressure on the sector until the 2000–2001 crisis. Banks, instead of channeling 
deposits  from  the  general  public  to  the  real  private  sector,  continued  to  finance  the 
government’s large budget deficits at high interest rates. For the Turkish banking sector, 
the period after the 1989 financial liberalization can be characterized as follows: in the 
period  before  the  2000–2001  crisis,  banks  operated  in  a  very  volatile  environment 
characterized by severe boom and bust cycles that resulted in a major banking crisis at 
the end of 2000 and early 2001 (see e.g. Alper and Öniş (2003) and Tanyeri (2010) for a 
detailed discussion). However, in the period after this crisis, the sector has improved its 
performance  as  a  result  of  solid  restructuring,  recapitalization,  and  supervision  and 
remained largely unfazed in the face of the recent global economic downturn.  
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The 2000–2001 crisis was a classic twin crisis caused by growing macroeconomic 
imbalances. Ultimately, the government was forced to abandon the euro-dollar crawling 
peg it had primarily initiated to tackle high inflation and had to face the collapse of the 
banking system. In reaction, the government adopted a comprehensive reform program 
supported  by  the  World  Bank  and  IMF.  An  important  part  of  this  program  was  the 
redesign of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) that became more 
effective  with  prudential  supervision  and  regulation  and  the  appropriate  enforcement 
power, credibility, and autonomous structure in the post-crisis period. Private banks were 
forced to strengthen their equity capital, either independently or through mergers and 
acquisitions, and about 20 fragile banks that failed to comply were transferred to the 
State Deposit Insurance Fund. The sector now has much stronger fundamentals and 
remains largely unfazed despite the recent global financial downturn. 
 
Turkish commercial banks operate as universal banks (offering a broad range of 
products  and  services  such  as  deposit-taking,  commercial  lending,  trading  financial 
instruments,  insurance,  leasing  and  investment  banking)  that  are  to  a  great  extent 
homogenous. After the liberalization of the market, the number of banks operating in the 
Turkish  banking  sector  increased  significantly  because  of  new  entrants,  big  and 
profitable public borrowing, and a full blanket deposit guarantee. Table A illustrates that, 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the number of banks dropped sharply from more 
than 50 to 31 in 2009. This shake-out occurred through the liquidation of banks with a 
weak capital basis and through voluntary mergers and acquisitions. Despite decreasing 
bank numbers, the banking assets grew massively after the crisis from $118 billion in 
2002 to about $518 billion in 2009. 
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With regard to ownership, commercial banks can be classified as public, domestic, 
or foreign banks. The Turkish banking landscape changed after the liberalization of the 
market because of mergers and acquisitions, new entries, and privatizations.  
 
A snapshot of the Turkish banking industry 
1990 1995 2000 2002 2005 2009
Number of banks: 56 55 50 38 33 31
- state-owned 8 5 4 3 3 3
- domestic 25 32 28 20 17 11
- foreign 23 18 18 15 13 17
Total Assets (mln 
dollars)
53,084 63,869 135,097 118,267 284,875 518,191
- state-owned (%) 0.49 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.32
- domestic (%) 0.47 0.56 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.54
- foreign (%) 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.14
Assets/GNP (%) 42.9 52.2 82.9 77.3 81.6 83.8
Number of employees 151,982 138,894 144,950 112,443 127,462 166,802
Number of branches 6,543 6,219 6,734 5,884 6,227 8,982  
Source: Banks Association of Turkey 
 
This table shows that, as of 2009, 31 deposit taking banks existed of which 3 were 
state owned, 11 were private domestic banks, and 17 were foreign banks. Despite the 
fact that the number of banks dropped heavily, the average number of branches per 
bank and staff per bank rose to record levels. Although the share of public banks in 
terms  of  total  assets  continues  to  decline  gradually,  its  impact  is  still  relatively  high 
compared to EU averages. The presence of foreign banks used to be limited because of 
the unstable environment and entry barriers. However, the sector has recently beckoned 
the  interest  of  foreign  banks  because  of  the  strong  growth  potential  and  the  solid 
economic  recovery.  The  Turkish  banking  system  still  offers  strong  growth  potential 
compared with EU countries. In fact, the ratio of Turkish banks’ assets to GNP was 
around 83% at the end of 2009, well below the EU average of more than 300 %. In the   53
future,  the  environment  of  sustainable  growth  potential,  relatively  high  margins,  low 
inflation, and declining intermediation costs are expected to support further growth in 
total assets, commercial loans, and deposit volumes of the banking system.  
 